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Institutional benchmarking of foreign aid effectiveness in Africa
Abstract
This  paper  integrates  two  main  strands  of  the  aid-development  nexus  in  providing 
additional  information  as  to  why  institutional  benchmarks  (thresholds)  matter  for  the 
effectiveness  of  aid  in  institutional  development.  Using  seven  government-quality  dynamics 
(rule  of  law,  regulation  quality,  government-effectiveness,  political-stability,  voice  & 
accountability, corruption-control and democracy), we provide a thorough assessment of the aid-
development  nexus when existing institutional  development  levels  matter.  Results  which are 
consistent across specifications and conditional distributions of institutional variables have three 
broad implications (with respect to three tested hypotheses). (1) Institutional benefits of foreign-
aid are contingent on existing institutional levels in Africa. (2) But for a thin exception, foreign-
aid is  instrumental  in  institutional  development  for countries  with low levels  of institutional 
quality. (3) Institutional quality benefits of development assistance are questionable in countries 
with high levels of institutional development. As a policy implication, blanket policies based on 
the aid-development nexus are unlikely to be appropriate; therefore policy measures should be 
contingent on prevailing levels of institutional development and tailored differently across best 
and worst countries in terms of institutional development. 
JEL Classification: B20; F35; F50; O10; O55
Keywords: Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa
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1. Introduction 
For  more  than  half  a  century,  the  political  economy of  foreign-aid  has  been  widely 
debated  in  academic  and  policy-making  circles.  A  substantial  literature  on  institutions  and 
development  suggests  that  Africa  is  poor  because  it  is  deficient  of  good  institutions: 
dictatorships, lack of property rights, weak courts and contract-enforcement, political instability, 
high corruption, violence and hostile regulatory environment for private business. With respect 
to this strand, in order to end African poverty,  the West needs to promote good institutions 
(Easterly,  2005a).   In  response  to  how foreign-aid  might  promote  good  institutions  in  aid-
recipient countries, much literature has focused on how institutions matter in the effectiveness of 
foreign-aid  (Alesina  &  Dollar,  2000;  Alesina  &  Weder,  2002;  Knack,  2001;  Dixit,  2004; 
Djankov et al., 2005; Asongu, 2012ab). 
From the interesting literature on aid and institutions,  the debate has centered around 
three  main  questions.  Firstly,  do  donors  allocate  more  to  poor  countries  who  have  better 
institutions (e.g less corruption, more democracy)? Secondly, does foreign-aid induce better or 
worse institutional quality? Thirdly, how would outsiders engineer a transition from the present 
state of informal institutions towards more formal institutional settings through foreign-aid? The 
first strand of the debate is relevant because donors have widely assumed that aid would be more 
effective in countries with better institutions. More so the answer to the first concern also affects 
the response to the second. Implying, if donors give more aid to countries with better institutions, 
this  would create  an incentive for reformers in the recipient  country to adapt to institutions. 
Much of the literature has found no evidence that democracies or less corrupt states are rewarded 
with more aid (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Alesina & Weder, 2002). On the second question, a great 
chunk  of  the  literature  has  pointed  to  the  institutional  (Knack,  2001;  Asongu,  2012a)  and 
3
democratic (Djankov et al.,  2005) perils of foreign-aid, especially in ethnically fractionalized 
states (Svensson, 2000).  Lastly, there is the thorny third question (strand) about how aid would 
practically go about changing institutions in the interest  of developing recipient countries.  In 
substance the transition from informal to formal institutions is somehow complex and attempts 
by Western aid agencies to introduce top-down formal institutions have not fared well in the 
complicated maze of bottom-up arrangements. To this third question, Dixit(2004) has presented 
an interesting argument as to how introducing imperfect rule-based institutions could actually 
make  things  worse,  as  they  create  outside  opportunities  for  members  of  relationship-based 
networks1.
This paper contributes to existing literature by integrating the last two strands highlighted 
above within  the  same empirical  framework.  Thus we put  some empirical  structure  on  two 
questions of the aid-institutions nexus in order to give policymakers guidance on the issues. In 
substance this work attempts to elucidate the following questions. Are the institutional benefits 
of development-assistance contingent on existing institutional quality (second strand)? At what 
institutional thresholds will foreign-aid be instrumental in improving institutional quality (third 
strand)?  Are  the  institutional  benefits  of  foreign-aid  questionable  until  greater  domestic 
institutional development has taken place(second and third strands)? 
It  has  been  well  documented  in  the  globalization-development  literature  that  certain 
‘threshold’ levels in financial and institutional development are imperative for an economy get 
the full indirect benefits and reduced risks of capital account globalization (Henry, 2007; Rodrik 
& Subramanian, 2009; Kose et al., 2011). Empirically assessing the aid-institutions nexus in the 
light  of  available  weight  of  empirical  evidence  on  ‘threshold  theories’  from  the  openness-
1 Network members can then cheat on their partners and vamoose to operate in the rule-based system. A society 
could get caught in-between formal and informal institutional settings with neither working well. 
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development literature could provide relevant  policy implications  on the two complementary 
research  questions  highlighted  above.  Though  not  in  form,  yet  in  substance,  the  existing 
literature points to the existence of certain initial institutional threshold conditions (corruption, 
democracy…etc) but lacks a unifying framework that explores the most quantifiable government 
quality  indicators  currently  available  (rule  of  law,  regulation  quality,  corruption-control, 
government-effectiveness,  voice  &  accountability,  political  stability  (or  no  violence)  and 
democracy)2. 
The contribution of this paper to the literature is fivefold. Firstly, we deviate from the 
mainstream approach to the aid-institutions nexus that does not incorporate all dimensions of 
government  quality  and  provide  an  exhaustive  assessment  with  seven  institutional  quality 
dynamics.  Secondly,  a substantial  bulk of studies in the literature is  based on data  collected 
between 1960 and 2001. By using much recent data, the paper provides an updated account of 
the  nexus  with  more  focused  policy  implications.  Thirdly,  owing  to  the  debate  on 
methodological issues in the assessment of foreign-aid effectiveness, this paper provides new 
dimensions to the debate by investigating the aid-development nexus when existing institutional 
quality dynamics matter. Thus there is the presumption here that certain institutional thresholds 
might  be  imperative  in  the  institutional-effectiveness  of  foreign-aid.  Fourthly,  this  paper 
integrates two of the three strands currently prevailing in the literature by putting some empirical 
structure  on them,  in  order  to  give  policymakers  the  much needed guidance.  Thus  blanket 
common aid policies   might not be effective unless they are contingent on the prevailing strands 
of the debate,  existing levels of ‘institutional development dynamics’ and tailored differently 
across countries with  the least and most advanced  institutions. Fifthly, with 2015 approaching, 
2 This is probably because most studies are based on data collected between 1960 and 2001. Government quality 
indicators for developing countries were not available before 1996(See World Development Indicators: Good 
Governance). 
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it  is  momentous  time  to  assess  donors’  objective  of  reaching  the  MDGs.  In  plainer  terms, 
examining the effectiveness of development assistance on institutions in the light of the four 
points underlined above (in the run-up to 2015) could provide crucial policy options to donor and 
multilateral agencies on their assistance impact.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents existing literature on aid 
effectiveness.  Measurement  and  methodology  issues  are  discussed  in  Section  3.  Empirical 
analysis is covered in Section 4. We conclude with Section 5. 
2. Literature review
2.1 Conflicts in the literature 
A great bulk of the literature on the effectiveness of aid has almost  exclusively been 
oriented towards the macroeconomic impacts of aid; assessing the effects of aid on economic 
savings,  investment  and  growth.  The  low-depth  of  analytical  framework,  heavy  reliance  on 
empirical evidence (which is often ambiguous at best) and inconclusive results with recently 
refined methodologies (Masud & Yontcheva, 2005), leaves the aid-development nexus widely 
open to debate.  For the purpose of clarity,  literature pertaining to the effectiveness of aid in 
growth  (development)  could  be  classified  into  two  strands  as  summarized  in  Table  1:  one 
acknowledging the negative consequences of aid and the other brandishing the positive rewards 
of development assistance.
The first strand includes authors advocating the case for the insignificant impact of aid on 
investment,  savings  or  growth.  Aid  has  been  established  to  improve  unproductive  public 
consumption (Mosley et al., 1992) and stops short of increasing investment. This later point has 
been validated by Boone (1996) and Reichel(1995).  Ghura(1995) has pointed to the negative 
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effect  of  aid  on  domestic  savings  whereas  Pedersen  (1996)  asserts,  foreign-aid  distorts 
development and ultimately leads to aid dependency. 
 
Table 1: Summary of conflicts in the literature
 Researchers Main findings 
First-strand: Aid does not lead to growth(development)
Mosley et al. (1992) Aid increases unproductive public consumption and fails to promote growth.
Reichel(1995) Aid fails to promote savings owing to the substitution effect.
Ghura(1995) Aid negatively impacts savings.
Boone(1996) Aid  is  insignificant  in  improving  economic  development  for  two  reasons: 
poverty is not caused by capital shortage and it is not optimal for politicians to 
adjust distortionary policies when they receive aid flows.
Pedersen (1996) Foreign Aid distorts development and leads to aid dependency.
Asongu(2012a) Development assistance is perilous to government quality dynamics 
Asongu(2012b) Development assistance is inhumane and leads to reversed economics
Second-strand : Aid improves growth(development)
Burnside & Dollar(2000) Aid can be effective when policies and economic management are good.
Ghura(1995) Aid positively impacts savings for good adjusters.
Guillaumont &  Chauvet (2001) Aid effectiveness is contingent on environmental factors(shocks and hazards)
Collier & Dehn(2001) Aid effectiveness depends on negative supply shocks. Targeting aid contingent 
of negative supply shocks is better than ‘targeting’ based on good policies. 
Collier & Dollar(2001) The positive effect of aid on poverty depends on its impact on per-capita
income growth; and impact of per-capita income growth on poverty
reduction.
Feeny (2003) The sectoral allocation of foreign aid to Papua New Guinea has been broadly
in line with a strategy to effectively reduce poverty and increase human
well-being. 
Gomanee et al.(2003) Aid  has  either  a  direct  effect  on  welfare  or  indirect  effect  through  public 
spending on social services. 
Clement et al. (2004) Aid has a short-term positive impact on growth
Ishfaq (2004) Foreign Aid, in a limited way though, has helped in reducing the
extent of poverty in Pakistan.
Mosley et al. (2004) Foreign assistance has an indirect impact on poverty and the well-being of
recipient countries.
Addison et al. (2005) Aid increases pro-poor public expenditure and has a positive effect on growth. 
Aid broadly works  to  mitigate  poverty,  and poverty would be higher  in  the 
absence of aid.
Fielding et al. (2006) There is a straight forward positive impact of aid on development outcomes. 
Source(Author)
In the second strand, we find studies brandishing the positive effects of aid on growth and 
development. Among these works, we shall highlight that of   Burnside & Dollar (2000) which 
conclude on the effectiveness of aid when policies are good. The Burnside & Dollar(2000) paper 
has received significant  comments from researchers(Guillaumont & Chauvet, 2001; Colier & 
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Dehn, 2001; Easterly et al., 2003); comments that have been challenged as being “extremely data 
dependent”(Clemens et al.,2004). 
2.2 Africa’s needs and Western responses 
A  substantial  number  of  African  countries  lie  quite  low  on  standard  international 
comparisons.  Borrowing  from  Easterly  (2005a),  they  occupy  most  of  the  bottom places  in 
income per capita, percentage of population living in extreme poverty(less than one US dollar a 
day),  life expectancy,  infant mortality,  literacy,  AIDS prevalence and the HDI. The last four 
decades  have  been  those  of  extreme  growth  dismay  in  Africa.  The  West  has  responded  to 
Africa’s  tragedy  with  intensive  involvement  of  foreign-aid  agencies  and  international 
organizations. In the mean, African countries receive much more aid in terms of percentage GDP 
than other developing countries. The West does more because Africa is poor, nay its efforts are 
supposed to have positive impacts on development. 
The year 2005 was that during which the West pressed hardest to salvage Africa. In July 
of that year, the G8 agreed to double foreign-aid to Africa from $25 billion a year to $50 billion 
to finance the ‘Big push’, as well as erase African aid-loans incurred during previous attempts at 
a ‘Big push’. Before this effort, Africa was already the most aid-intensive region on the planet.  
In September of that same year, world leaders assembled at the United Nations to further discuss 
progress on ending poverty in the continent. 
 2.3 Theories and effects of Western assistance on Africa
2.3.1 The Big-Push models and foreign-aid
In line with Easterly (2005a), ‘Big-Push’ models postulate that Africa is poor because it 
is stuck in a ‘poverty trap’. To emerge from the poverty trap, the continent need’s a large aid-
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financed increase in investment; a ‘Big Push’. Both the Harrod-Domar and the Solow growth 
models have been used to elucidate the mechanisms of the poverty trap. The first mechanism is 
that, savings are quite low for people who are very nigh to subsistence (as outlined by a Stone-
Geary utility function). In a closed economy, savings and investment are equal, thus investment 
is quite thin. In the Harrod-Domar model with the capital constraint binding, per capita growth in 
GDP  is  a  mere  linear  function  of  the  investment  (=saving)  rate  minus  the  population  and 
depreciation  rates.  If  the  saving  is  quite  low to  compensate  for  population  growth  and  the 
depreciation of capita, then per capita growth in the economy will be zero or negative. In the 
1950s and 1960s, early development economists postulated a desirable per capita growth rate 
and calculated the ‘investment requirement’ to meet this target: the deviation between the low 
domestic savings rate and the ‘investment requirement’ was termed the ‘Financing Gap’. The 
object of aid was hence to cover the Financing Gap (Rostow, 1960; Chenery & Strout, 1966). 
Thus this model foresaw a strong growth effect for foreign-aid via its role in boosting domestic 
investment above what domestic savings could finance. Although this model soon went out of 
esteem in the academic literature on development, it remained somehow relevant in international 
organizations like the World Bank. Current policy proponents promoting foreign-aid to Africa 
have explicitly positioned their cases in favor of this model (Devarajan et al., 2002 at the World 
Bank; Blair Commission on Africa, 2005; Sachs, 2005). Sach(2005) has posited:  “success in  
ending the poverty trap will be much easier than it appears”. He has asserted that the increase in 
foreign-aid and debt relief  can end Africa’s poverty in our generation.  In a closed economy, 
savings  depend  not  only  on  the  margin  from subsistence  but  also  on  the  incentive  to  save 
contingent on the rate of return to savings and investment. In an open economy for instance, 
investment is not only a function of domestic savings but is also endogenous to the rate of return 
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to  investment.  As shown by Africa’s  extensive  capital  flight  in  which  an estimated  39% of 
African  capital  stock  is  held  outside  the  continent(Collier  et  al.,2001),  domestic  investors 
compare the returns to domestic and foreign investments:  since private foreign investors and 
bank lenders will invest in an economy only if returns are very appealing. In the Solow model, a 
strong link between income and saving rates could generate multiple equilibria at low and high 
thresholds of capital stock, resurfacing the possibility of a poverty trap. Again, the low domestic 
savings  do  not  pose  much  of  an  issue  in  an  open  economy  in  which  investment  reacts  to 
incentives.  Kraay & Raddatz(2005)  have shown that the relationship between initial capital and 
savings must follow an S-shaped curve to generate a poverty trap; however they stop short of 
finding significant evidence for this shape in their data. 
The  second  poverty  generating  mechanism  is  some  sort  of  nonconvexity  of  the 
production function in the Solow model. There could be strong external economies to investment 
or there maybe high fixed costs to investment projects such that a minimum threshold must be 
surpassed for investment  to be rewarding (productive).  This perspective inspired the original 
article that first proposed a ‘Big Push’ (Rosentein-Rodan, 1943). This strand has had a longer 
shelf-life in the academic literature than the “Financing Gap” model (mechanism) because of the 
great  esteem  of  theorists  in  models  with  multiple  equilibira(  Murphy  et  al.,  1989).  In 
emphasizing such nonconvexities, Sach(2005)  has posited  that Africa is in a poverty trap. ‘Big 
Push’ models foretell strong impacts of foreign-aid on investment and growth (development). 
This  prediction  has  been subject  to  a  vast  empirical  literature  which  this  paper  has  already 
covered and summarized above (see Table 1 in Section 2.1). 
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2.3.2 Project interventions: education and health
Another strand of Africa’s poverty has been that, it results from low human capital (poor 
health & education) and infrastructure. This emphasis which began in the 1960s is still central in 
explaining Africa’s poverty. Whereas enrollments have soared rapidly, the quality of education 
is hampered by missing inputs like textbooks and other school material,  weak incentives for 
teachers, corruption in education bureaucracies and disruption of schooling by political  crisis 
(Filmer & Pritchett, 1997).  In health, some of the initial progress has slowed, possibly due to 
corruption in the health sector (studies in Cameroon, Guinea, Uganda and Tanzania show that 30 
to 70% of government drugs disappeared before reaching patients) and more complicated health 
problems  cannot  be  solved  with  routine  methods(Filmer  et  al.,  2000;  Pritchett  & 
Woolcock,2004). 
2.3.3 Models of policies and growth
The  structural  adjustment  programs  emerged  from  another  strand  as  to  why  Africa 
remains poor and this gained prominence in the early 1980s with the advent of the ‘Washington 
consensus’ and the pro-free markets arguments of people like the renowned World Bank chief 
economist Anne Krueger. With respect to this thesis, Africa is poor because its governments 
have chosen bad policies. Indeed, it is obvious that many African governments pursued policies 
very detrimental to growth and economic development: artificially overvalued currencies, high 
black market premiums on foreign exchange, controls on interest rates that led to negative real 
interest rates for savers, drastic (radical) restrictions on international trade and almost exclusive 
reliance on state enterprise. The ‘bad policies’ perception of Africa’s poverty led to a different 
perspective of the role of aid. The role of Western donors and international institutions in this 
view was to induce changes in African policies by making aid endogenous to such changes. 
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Structural  adjustment  loans  of  the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank  were  thus  embodied  in  this 
framework: which had as object an “adjustment with growth”.  How successful have these loans 
been in facilitating macroeconomic adjustment, that is to say: changing policy? How successful 
has development assistance been in inducing appealing policies? The answer from a substantial 
bulk of literature appears to be that Western donors and international institutions have not been 
very successful at changing policy (Alesina & Dollar, 2002; Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Van de 
Walle, 2001; Easterly, 2005b). However these studies are based on old data. Perhaps using much 
recent data (as this paper aims) could provide different trends in the nexus.
2.3.4 Dysfunctional donors 
Borrowing from Easterly (2005a), while all the attention in the ‘aid and development’ 
debate  is  focused on Africa,  it  is  also  interesting  to  examine  how effective  donors  were in 
delivering valuable services to the continent. There have been substantial uncomfortable signs of 
donor dysfunction. A case in point is the over 2 billion US dollars spent on roads in Tanzania 
over the last two decades. Yet roads have not improved. Even by bureaucratic standards, foreign- 
aid  bureaucracy  is  dire.  Why?  Maybe  it  is  because  efforts  and  results  in  aid  are  largely 
unobservable  and  noticed  only  by  the  voiceless  and  powerless  poor.  Thus,  the  absence  of 
visibility on feed-backs and results makes aid bureaucracies unaccountable. Unlike democratic 
governments  or private firms in rich countries,  aid agencies do not face a “voter test” or “a 
market  test”.  Hence Africa’s poor could be conceived as political  orphans; with no voice or 
feedback on if aid is helping (and nobody accountable to them).
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2.4 Aids, institutions and development 
An extensive  literature  on  institutions  and  development  suggests  that  Africa  is  poor 
because it has poor institutions: dictatorship, lack of property rights, weak courts and contract 
enforcement,  violence  and  political  instability,  hostile  regulatory  environment  for  private 
business and price instability. In a bid to end African poverty, according to this perspective the 
West  needs  to  promote  good  institutions  and  governance.  Svensson(2000)  finds  that  aid 
increases corruption in ethnically fractionalized states (which  is the situation of most African 
countries). The results of Knack (2001) suggest that higher aid worsens bureaucratic quality,  
leads to violation of established laws with great impunity and more corruption (controlling for 
potential reverse causality). In the same line of march, Djankov et al.(2005) notice that high aid 
caused  setbacks  to  democracy  between  1960  and  1999.  Indeed  they  found  aid’s  effect  on 
democracy to be worse than that attributed to the ‘natural resource curse’. 
From the interesting literature on aid and institutions, in examining if donors can still 
influence institutions at the margin,  three questions have received much attention.  Firstly,  do 
donors  give  more  to  poor  countries  who  have  better  institutions  (e.g  less  corruption,  more 
democracy)? Secondly, does aid induce better or worse institutional quality? Thirdly, how would 
outsiders  engineer  a  transition  from the  present  state  of  informal  institutions  towards  more 
formal institutional settings? The first question is relevant because there is a presumption by 
donors that aid would be more effective in countries with better institutions. The answer to the 
first issue also affects the response to the second. Thus, if donors give more aid to countries with 
better institutions, this would create some motivation for reformers in the recipient country to 
adapt better institutions. Surprisingly, Alesina & Dollar (2000) and Alesina & Weder(2002) find 
no evidence that democracies or less corrupt states are rewarded with more aid. Lastly, there is 
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the thorny third issue about how aid would practically go about  changing institutions  in the 
interest of recipient countries. The transition from informal to formal institutions is somehow 
complex. Attempts by Western aid agencies to introduce top-down formal institutions have not 
fared well in the complicated maze of bottom-up arrangements in African societies. Dixit (2004) 
has  an  interesting  argument  as  to  how  introducing  imperfect  rule-based  institutions  could 
actually make things worse: they create outside opportunities for members of relationship-based 
networks. Network members can then cheat on their partners and vacate to operate in the rule-
based  system.  A  society  could  get  caught  in-between  formal  and  informal  institutions  with 
neither working appropriately. Before closing this section, it is worthwhile noting that this part 
of the literature has guided our choice of institutional quality benchmarks we shall employ in the 
empirical phase of this paper. These include: control of corruption, government effectiveness, 
political  stability  (no  violence),  voice  &  accountability,  rule  of  law,  regulation  quality  and 
democracy. 
2.5 The scope and positioning of the current paper
According Clement et al.(2004), aggregate aid  could be divided into three categories: (1) 
emergency and humanitarian aid(likely to be negatively correlated with growth); (2) aid that 
impacts  growth  only  over  the  long-term(if  at  all),  such  as  aid  to  support  democracy,  the 
environment, health or education; and (3) aid that plausibly could stimulate growth in the long 
term, including budget and balance of payments support, investments in infrastructure and aid 
for productive sectors (such as agricultural  and industrial).  Whereas aid effectiveness  papers 
implicitly define donors’ objective as solely the promotion of economic growth or the reduction 
of poverty in the recipient countries, a parallel strand of literature on aid allocation has sustained 
that most donors often pursue a different underlying agenda by allocating aid according to their 
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own strategic interest. Masud & Yontcheva(2005) have underlined that if a significant part of aid 
is channeled for strategic purposes, no positive impact in terms of growth or poverty alleviation 
should be expected. We partially negate this claim by arguing that; foreign-aid irrespective of 
vested donor-interest should contribute to institutional development (degradation) either directly 
or indirectly.
From the interesting literature on aid and institutions,  the debate has centered around 
three  main  questions  (strands)  as we  have  observed  in  the  preceding  section.  This  paper 
contributes to existing literature by integrating the last two strands within the same empirical 
framework. Thus we put some empirical structure on the aid-institutions nexus in order to give 
policymakers guidance on how to approach the two questions of the debate. In substance this 
work attempts to elucidate the following questions. Are the institutional benefits of development-
assistance  contingent  on  existing  institutional  quality (second  strand)? At  what  institutional 
thresholds will foreign-aid be instrumental in improving institutional quality (third strand)? Are 
the  institutional  benefits  of  foreign-aid  questionable  until  greater  domestic  institutional 
development has taken place (second and third strands)? 
It  has  been  well  documented  in  the  globalization-development  literature  that  certain 
‘threshold’ levels of financial and institutional development are imperative for an economy to get 
the full indirect benefits and reduced risks of capital account globalization (Henry, 2007; Rodrik 
& Subramanian, 2009; Kose et al., 2011). Empirically assessing the aid-institutions nexus in the 
light  of  available  weight  of  empirical  evidence  on  ‘threshold  theories’  in  the  openness-
development literature could provide relevant policy implications on the last two complementary 
research  questions  highlighted  above.  Though  not  in  form,  yet  in  substance,  the  existing 
literature points to the existence of certain initial institutional threshold conditions (corruption, 
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democracy…etc) but lacks a unifying framework that explores the most quantifiable government 
quality  indicators  currently  available  (rule  of  law,  regulation  quality,  corruption-control, 
government-effectiveness,  voice  &  accountability,  political  stability  or  no  violence  and 
democracy)3. 
The contribution of this paper to the literature is fivefold. Firstly, we deviate from the 
mainstream approach to the aid-institutions nexus that does not incorporate all dimensions of 
government  quality  and  provide  an  exhaustive  assessment  with  seven  institutional  quality 
dynamics.  Secondly,  a  substantial  bulk  of  work  in  the  literature  is  based  on data  collected 
between 1960 and 2001. By using much recent data, the paper provides an updated account of 
the  nexus  with  more  focused  policy  implications.  Thirdly,  owing  to  the  debate  on 
methodological issues in the assessment of foreign-aid effectiveness, this paper provides new 
dimensions to the debate by investigating the aid-development nexus when existing institutional 
quality dynamics matter. Thus there is the presumption here that certain institutional thresholds 
might be imperative in the effectiveness of foreign-aid. Fourthly, this paper integrates two of the 
three strands currently prevailing in the literature by putting some empirical structure on them, in 
order to oriented policymakers.  Blanket aid policies   might not be effective unless they are 
contingent on the prevailing strands of the debate, existing levels of ‘institutional development 
dynamics’  and  tailored  differently  across  countries  with   the  least  and  most  advanced 
institutions. Fifthly, with 2015 approaching, it is momentous time to assess donors’ objective of 
reaching the MDGs. In plainer terms, assessing the effectiveness of development assistance on 
institutions in the light of the four points underlined above (in the run-up to 2015) could provide 
crucial policy options to donor and multilateral agencies on their assistance impact. 
3 This is probably because most studies are based on data collected between 1960 and 2001. Government quality 
indicators for developing countries were not available before 1996(See World Development Indicators: Good 
Governance). 
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
We examine a sample of 22 countries for the period 2002-2009 with data from African 
Development  Indicators  (ADI)  of  the  World  Bank  (WB).  Institutional  quality  dependent 
variables  include:  the  rule  of  law,  regulation  quality,  corruption-control,  government-
effectiveness,  voice & accountability,  political  stability (or no violence) and democracy.  The 
independent variable of interest is Net Official Development Assistance (NODA). For robustness 
purposes we use three different NODA indicators: Total NODA; NODA from the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) countries; and NODA from Multilateral Donors. Whereas the first 
is used in the empirical section, the last two have been used for robustness checks.  Borrowing 
from  recent  development  threshold  literature  (Asongu,  2012c),  we  control  for  inflation, 
economic  prosperity,  population  growth,  autocracy,  foreign  investment,  trade,  per  capita 
economic prosperity and public investment. Summary statistics with presentation of countries 
(Appendix  1),  variable  definitions  (Appendix  2)  and  correlation  analysis  (Appendix  3)  are 
detailed in the appendices.
3.2 Methodology 
Borrowing  from  Billger  &  Goel  (2009)  and  recent  development  threshold  literature 
(Asongu,2012c)  to  determine  whether  existing  levels  in  development  dynamics  affects  how 
development assistance comes into play, we use quantile regression. This approach permits us to 
investigate if the relationship between institutional dynamics and foreign-aid differs throughout 
the distributions of institutional dynamics (Koenker & Hallock, 2001).
Some studies  on  the  determinants  of  institutional-quality  are  based  on estimation  by 
Ordinary Least  Squares (OLS),  which report  parameter  estimates  at  the conditional  mean of 
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institutional  development.  Whereas mean effects  are certainly important,  this  study broadens 
such findings using quantile regression. In addition, one of the underlying assumptions of OLS 
regression is that the error term and the dependent variable are normally distributed. However, in 
quantile  regression  the  error  term  need  not  be  distributed  normally.  Thus,  based  on  this 
estimation technique we are able to carefully assess the incidence of development  assistance 
throughout the conditional distribution with particular emphasis on countries with the best and 
worst institutions. Quantile regression( hence QR) yields parameters estimated at multiple points 
in  the  conditional  distribution  of  the  dependent  variable(Koenker  & Bassett,  1978)  and  has 
gained  increasing relevance in recent development literature(Billger &  Goel, 2009; Okada & 
Samreth, 2012). Beyond these facts, the choice of this estimation technique is in line with the 
research hypotheses  stressed in  the motivation  of  the  paper.   Accordingly,  the  θ th  quantile 
estimator  of  the  endogenous  variable  is  obtained  by  solving  for  the  following  optimization 
problem.

























                                         (1)
Where θ ∈ ( 0 ,1). Contrary to OLS that is based on minimizing the sum of squared residuals, 
with QR we minimize the weighted sum of absolute deviations. For example the 10th or 75th 
quantiles  (with  θ =0.10 or  0.75  respectively) by  approximately  weighing  the  residuals.  The 
conditional quantile of iy given ix is:
θβθ iiy xxQ ′=)/(                                                                                      (2)
where unique slope parameters are derived for each θ th quantile of interest. This formulation is 
analogous to  βixxyE ′=)/( in the OLS slope though parameters are estimated only at  the 
mean of the conditional distribution of the endogenous variable.  For the model in Eq.(2) the 
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dependent variable  iy  is an institutional quality  indicator while  ix  contains a constant term, 
foreign-aid,  inflation,  economic prosperity,  population growth, autocracy,  foreign investment, 
trade, per capita economic prosperity and public investment. The quantile estimation approach is 
more robust than the OLS approach in the presence of outliers  when the distribution of the 
dependent variable is a highly non-normal pattern (Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2012c). 
We also report findings for Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) which should correspond to those 
of the 0.5th quantile.  
4. Empirical analysis
4.1 Summary of results 
The results presented in Tables 3-6 include OLS, LAD and QR estimates. OLS estimates 
provide a baseline of mean effects  and we compare these to estimates of LAD and separate 
quantiles in the conditional distributions of the institutional development dependent variables. In 
the interpretation of estimated coefficients, it is worth noting that smaller values (in conditional 
distributions) of the dependent variable denote less institutional quality (democracy, rule of law, 
regulation  quality,  government  effectiveness,  political  stability,  voice  &  accountability  and 
corruption-control). Table 3 shows results for the rule of law (Panel A) and regulation quality 
(Panel  B)  regressions.  Table  4  reports  findings  on  government  effectiveness  (Panel  A)  and 
political stability (Panel B). Results pertaining to Table 5, reflect those of voice & accountability 
and control of corruption. Democracy regressions are disclosed in Table 6. 
Table 2 below summaries foreign-aid elasticities of institutional development based on 
Tables  3-6.  This  spirit  of  this  summary  is  to  synthesize  the  incidence  of  foreign-aid  on 
institutional  development  when  existing  government-quality  dynamics  matter.  Hence  from 
horizontal and vertical comparative perspectives, policy-makers could have some guidance on 
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the issue of institutional benchmarks (thresholds) in the African aid-development nexus. Based 
on the summary of results below, the following broad conclusions could be established. (1)While 
bottom quantiles of the institutional dynamic distributions reflect positive foreign-aid elasticities 
of  government  quality,  top  quantiles  suggest  the  contrary.  (2)  Foreign-aid  is  more  likely to 
improve institutional development when existing institutional development levels are low than 
when good governance is already substantial in an economy.
Table 2: Summary of results (foreign-aid elasticities of institutional development) 
Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Rule of Law Regulation Quality
Spec. 1 0.019*** 0.014*** -0.014*** -0.009 -0.013*** 0.007* 0.009 -0.014*** -0.003 -0.009
Spec. 2 0.020*** 0.004 -0.031*** -0.037*** -0.036*** 0.018*** 0.013*** -0.016*** -0.035*** -0.051***
Government Effectiveness Political Stability
Spec. 1 0.017*** 0.006 -0.016*** -0.007** 0.003*** -0.003 0.010 0.010 -0.004 -0.003
Spec. 2 0.011*** -0.0007 -0.008 -0.042*** -0.059*** 0.036*** -0.001 0.004 -0.011 -0.016*
Voice & Accountability Control of Corruption
Spec. 1 0.008** -0.019*** -0.011** -0.013*** -0.010*** 0.015*** 0.0109 -0.008* -0.005 0.020***
Spec. 2 0.009*** -0.002 0.009 -0.038*** -0.035*** 0.011* 0.003 -0.008 -0.044*** -0.046***
Democracy
Spec. 1 0.052*** -0.029 -0.097*** -0.121*** -0.052***
Spec. 2 -0.015 0.032** 0.027 -0.157*** -0.158***
*,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where  institutional quality is 
least. Spec: Specification. 
Table 3 below shows results for the rule of law(Panel A) and regulation quality(Panel B) 
regressions on the aid-development nexus when existing institutional levels in the ‘rule of law’ 
and regulation quality matter. From Panel A, it could be observed from the first specification that 
‘development assistance’ bears a positive relation with the ‘rule of law’ only when existing ‘rule 
of law’ levels are low; implying only bottom quantiles of the institutional quality distribution 
reflect some positive incidence of foreign-aid on institutional development. These findings are 
consistent with the second specification of the panel as well as the two specifications pertaining 
to ‘regulation quality’ distributions in Panel B. Most control variables are significant with the 
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right signs since: (1) inflationary pressures could seriously infringe on the ‘rule of law’ and 
regulation quality, as evidenced from the socio-political unrests across Africa owing to soaring 
food prices in 2008; (2) population growth inherently reflects a danger to the ‘rule of law’ if 
measures are not put in place to improve security in the face of rising demography;  and (3)  
autocratic governments are generally associated with little regulation quality and ‘rule of law’ in 
the African continent(Asongu, 2011). 
Table 4 below reports findings on ‘government effectiveness’ (Panel A) and ‘political 
stability’  (Panel  B).  But  for  the  positive  effect  in  the  top  quantile  of  the  government-
effectiveness distribution in the first specification, findings are broadly consistent with those in 
Table 3. Thus, the institutional benefits of foreign-aid are present only in bottom quantiles of the 
government-effectiveness and political-stability distributions. This establishment is valid across 
specifications and distributions. Most control variables are significant with the rights signs; their 
elucidation is in line with the interpretations already given above with respect to Table 3.
Results pertaining to Table 5 below reflect those of ‘voice & accountability’ and ‘control 
of corruption’. But for the top quantile of the ‘corruption-control’ distribution (in specification 
1),  findings  across specifications  and distributions  are in line with those of Tables  3-4.  The 
interpretation of foreign-aid and control variables elasticities are similar to those pertaining to 
Tables 3-4. 
Democracy  regressions  as  disclosed  in  Table  6  below  are  no  exception  to  the  rule 
regarding the findings and interpretations already outlined in respect of results in the preceding 
tables. 
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Table 3: Rule of Law and Regulation Quality  
Panel A: Rule of Law 
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant 0.528*** 0.483* -1.091*** 0.064 0.483*** 1.213*** 1.335***
(0.000) (0.054) (0.000) (0.286) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Development Assistance  0.003 -0.014* 0.019*** 0.014*** -0.014*** -0.009 -0.013***
(0.568) (0.069) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.113) (0.002)
Economic Prosperity 0.008 0.005 -0.002 0.002 0.005 -0.004 -0.003
(0.485) (0.732) (0.501) (0.712) (0.589) (0.733) (0.692)
Inflation -0.004 -0.008** -0.0007 -0.001 -0.008*** -0.008** -0.005**
(0.226) (0.019) (0.362) (0.422) (0.000) (0.015) (0.035)
Population growth -0.460*** -0.276*** -0.142*** -0.421*** -0.276*** -0.440*** -0.427***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Autocracy  -0.029** -0.055* 0.022*** -0.045*** -0.055*** -0.082*** -0.083***
(0.025) (0.054) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations  176 176 176 176 176 176 176
Specification 2
Constant -0.627*** -0.408* -1.629*** -1.212*** -0.408*** -0.405*** -0.718***
(0.000) (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Development Assistance -0.022*** -0.031*** 0.020*** 0.004 -0.031*** -0.037*** -0.036***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.510) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Foreign Direct Investment 0.008 0.023 -0.006 0.002 0.023** 0.000 0.004
(0.530) (0.357) (0.167) (0.851) (0.048) (0.997) (0.171)
Trade  0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.005*** 0.012***
(0.804) (0.824) (0.794) (0.774) (0.699) (0.000) (0.000)
Per capita Economic Prosperity -0.015 0.005 -0.004 -0.029** 0.005 0.015** 0.010***
(0.254) (0.833) (0.349) (0.035) (0.683) (0.021) (0.005)
Public Investment  0.045*** 0.033 0.036*** 0.050*** 0.033** 0.023*** 0.035***
(0.004) (0.139) (0.000) (0.001) (0.015) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 176 176 176 176 176 176 176
Panel B: Regulation Quality 
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant 0.397*** 0.749*** -0.531*** -0.387** 0.749*** 1.012*** 0.984***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Development Assistance  -0.005 -0.014*** 0.007* 0.009 -0.014*** -0.003 -0.009
(0.288) (0.007) (0.060) (0.180) (0.000) (0.284) (0.345)
Economic Prosperity 0.001 -0.002 -0.012 -0.016 -0.002 0.011* 0.016
(0.906) (0.899) (0.129) (0.251) (0.744) (0.060) (0.406)
Inflation -0.006** -0.006*** -0.002 -0.004 -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.010*
(0.023) (0.002) (0.375) (0.240) (0.000) (0.000) (0.057)
Population growth -0.280*** -0.325*** -0.173*** -0.113 -0.325*** -0.435*** -0.269**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.143) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012)
Autocracy  -0.038*** -0.086*** 0.003 -0.006 -0.086*** -0.095*** -0.093***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.653) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations  176 176 176 176 176 176 176
Specification 2
Constant -0.180 -0.096 -1.220*** -0.833*** -0.096 0.175 0.554***
(0.128) (0.554) (0.000) (0.000) (0.401) (0.167) (0.000)
Development Assistance -0.017*** -0.016 0.018*** 0.013*** -0.016*** -0.035*** -0.051***
(0.004) (0.106) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
Foreign Direct Investment -0.003 -0.0001 -0.021* -0.015*** -0.0001 0.021* 0.014
(0.764) (0.993) (0.060) (0.004) (0.988) (0.066) (0.228)
Trade  -0.000 -0.002 0.002** 0.001*** -0.002* -0.001 -0.0006
(0.944) (0.228) (0.024) (0.003) (0.065) (0.237) (0.606)
Per capita Economic Prosperity -0.018 -0.012 -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.012 0.008 0.007
(0.115) (0.610) (0.005) (0.000) (0.275) (0.521) (0.564)
Public Investment  0.004 0.009 0.009 -0.001 0.009 0.011 0.013
(0.723) (0.694) (0.457) (0.852) (0.435) (0.398) (0.345)
Observations 176 176 176 176 176 176 176
Notes.   Dependent  variables  are   Regulation  Quality  and the   Rule  of  Law.   *,**,***,  denote  significance  levels  of   10%, 5% and 1%  
respectively. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Regulation Quality and(or) the  Rule of Law  are(is) least. P-values in brackets.
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Table 4: Government Effectiveness and Political Stability 
Panel A: Government Effectiveness  
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant 0.488*** 0.856*** -0.870*** -0.265*** 0.856*** 1.029*** 1.347***
(0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Development Assistance  -0.0006 -0.016** 0.017*** 0.006 -0.016*** -0.007** 0.003***
(0.911) (0.033) (0.000) (0.144) (0.000) (0.049) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity 0.009 0.017 -0.007* -0.002 0.017** 0.006 -0.004***
(0.382) (0.339) (0.097) (0.758) (0.036) (0.393) (0.000)
Inflation -0.003 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.004** -0.004** -0.004***
(0.300) (0.210) (0.214) (0.586) (0.040) (0.027) (0.000)
Population growth -0.397*** -0.405*** -0.165*** -0.194*** -0.405*** -0.400*** -0.489***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Autocracy  -0.037*** -0.102*** 0.013*** -0.025*** -0.102*** -0.096*** -0.105***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations  176 176 176 176 176 176 176
Specification 2
Constant -0.382*** -0.616*** -1.507*** -0.783*** -0.616*** -0.028 0.354***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.789) (0.000)
Development Assistance -0.022*** -0.008 0.011*** -0.0007 -0.008 -0.042*** -0.059***
(0.000) (0.476) (0.000) (0.930) (0.191) (0.000) (0.000)
Foreign Direct Investment 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.003 -0.018* -0.014**
(0.973) (0.910) (0.999) (0.792) (0.801) (0.065) (0.017)
Trade  -0.0006 -0.0001 0.001*** -0.001 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0001
(0.582) (0.964) (0.000) (0.235) (0.933) (0.691) (0.758)
Per capita Economic Prosperity -0.012 -0.009 -0.013*** -0.036** -0.009 0.0027 0.027***
(0.302) (0.755) (0.000) (0.023) (0.446) (0.795) (0.000)
Public Investment  0.034** 0.035 0.030*** 0.036** 0.035** 0.056*** 0.041***
(0.015) (0.138) (0.000) (0.038) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 176 176 176 176 176 176 176
Panel B: Political Stability 
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant 0.611*** 0.659*** -0.435* 0.414*** 0.659*** 1.343*** 1.628***
(0.002) (0.009) (0.059) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Development Assistance  0.012 0.010 -0.003 0.010 0.010 -0.004 -0.003
(0.194) (0.433) (0.748) (0.160) (0.203) (0.602) (0.544)
Economic Prosperity -0.005 -0.003 -0.034 -0.007 -0.003 -0.023 -0.035***
(0.792) (0.896) (0.127) (0.612) (0.836) (0.202) (0.001)
Inflation -0.002 -0.003 0.004 0.001 -0.003 -0.009* -0.010***
(0.601) (0.566) (0.493) (0.662) (0.523) (0.059) (0.007)
Population growth -0.477*** -0.382*** -0.445*** -0.631*** -0.382*** -0.300*** -0.319***
(0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Autocracy  -0.018 -0.067* 0.082*** -0.003 -0.067*** -0.113*** -0.109***
(0.367) (0.074) (0.000) (0.839) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations  176 176 176 176 176 176 176
Specification 2
Constant -1.061*** -0.725*** -3.054*** -1.564*** -0.725*** -0.357 -0.005
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.250) (0.978)
Development Assistance -0.003 0.004 0.036*** -0.001 0.004 -0.011 -0.016*
(0.752) (0.739) (0.000) (0.923) (0.605) (0.460) (0.087)
Foreign Direct Investment 0.004 0.006 -0.001 -0.023 0.006 0.077*** 0.036**
(0.819) (0.841) (0.903) (0.323) (0.678) (0.008) (0.036)
Trade  0.007*** 0.004 0.012*** 0.007*** 0.004** 0.005* 0.007***
(0.000) (0.152) (0.000) (0.002) (0.012) (0.054) (0.000)
Per capita Economic Prosperity -0.025 -0.034 0.0004 -0.033 -0.034** -0.033 -0.022
(0.177) (0.127) (0.967) (0.185) (0.039) (0.271) (0.210)
Public Investment  0.030 0.021 0.019 0.038 0.021 0.008 0.013
(0.155) (0.475) (0.121) (0.167) (0.255) (0.799) (0.502)
Observations 176 176 176 176 176 176 176
Notes.  Dependent variable are Government-effectiveness and Political-stability.  *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where  Government-effectiveness and(or) Political-stability are(is) least.  P-values in 
brackets.
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Table 5: Voice & Accountability and Control of Corruption
Panel A: Voice & Accountability 
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant 0.375** 1.010*** -1.312*** 0.184 1.010*** 1.068*** 1.085***
(0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.154) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Development Assistance  -0.0006 -0.011 0.008** -0.019*** -0.011** -0.013*** -0.010***
(0.930) (0.332) (0.016) (0.002) (0.047) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity 0.005 -0.0004 -0.010 -0.019 -0.0004 -0.008 -0.003
(0.729) (0.978) (0.111) (0.115) (0.969) (0.156) (0.326)
Inflation -0.002 -0.005 0.002 -0.0004 -0.005 -0.004*** -0.006***
(0.509) (0.405) (0.170) (0.899) (0.119) (0.005) (0.000)
Population growth -0.293*** -0.360*** -0.025 -0.172*** -0.360*** -0.255*** -0.202***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.473) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Autocracy  -0.106*** -0.216*** -0.009 -0.147*** -0.216*** -0.215*** -0.214***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.165) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations  176 176 176 176 176 176 176
Specification 2
Constant -0.465*** -0.564* -1.452*** -1.032*** -0.564** 0.083 0.519***
(0.007) (0.065) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.565) (0.000)
Development Assistance -0.007 0.009 0.009*** -0.002 0.009 -0.038*** -0.035***
(0.392) (0.709) (0.000) (0.726) (0.476) (0.000) (0.000)
Foreign Direct Investment 0.010 0.018 -0.007* 0.003 0.018 0.004 -0.005**
(0.529) (0.700) (0.063) (0.788) (0.418) (0.739) (0.016)
Trade  0.001 0.004 0.0006* -0.001 0.004* 0.003** 0.002***
(0.415) (0.338) (0.100) (0.365) (0.078) (0.029) (0.000)
Per capita Economic Prosperity -0.028* -0.061* -0.011*** -0.006 -0.061** -0.009 0.018***
(0.093) (0.081) (0.005) (0.637) (0.012) (0.527) (0.000)
Public Investment  0.006 -0.016 0.0005 -0.0003 -0.016 0.031* -0.003
(0.742) (0.692) (0.902) (0.981) (0.535) (0.051) (0.183)
Observations 176 176 176 176 176 176 176
Panel B: Control of Corruption 
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant 0.649*** 0.737*** -0.335*** 0.125 0.737*** 0.971*** 1.689***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.540) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Development Assistance  0.005 -0.008 0.015*** 0.0109 -0.008* -0.005 0.020***
(0.270) (0.262) (0.000) (0.270) (0.070) (0.108) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity 0.004 0.003 0.005** -0.005 0.003 -0.009 -0.025***
(0.693) (0.823) (0.025) (0.783) (0.691) (0.126) (0.002)
Inflation -0.002 -0.003 0.0008 -0.0005 -0.003 -0.003** -0.001
(0.318) (0.345) (0.146) (0.923) (0.157) (0.039) (0.539)
Population growth -0.508*** -0.437*** -0.405*** -0.441*** -0.437*** -0.411*** -0.649***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Autocracy  0.034*** -0.069*** 0.005** -0.007 -0.069*** -0.086*** -0.107***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.033) (0.715) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations  176 176 176 176 176 176 176
Specification 2
Constant -0.666*** -0.870*** -1.398*** -1.197*** -0.870*** -0.329** 0.278
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.106)
Development Assistance -0.019*** -0.008 0.011* 0.003 -0.008 -0.044*** -0.046***
(0.003) (0.428) (0.064) (0.286) (0.242) (0.000) (0.000)
Foreign Direct Investment 0.002 -0.010 -0.015 -0.001 -0.010 -0.011 0.041***
(0.817) (0.697) (0.166) (0.587) (0.445) (0.410) (0.010)
Trade  0.001 0.003* 0.001 0.001*** 0.003** 0.002* -0.001
(0.233) (0.075) (0.144) (0.005) (0.014) (0.065) (0.409)
Per capita Economic Prosperity -0.021* -0.001 -0.025** -0.036*** -0.001 0.015 -0.007
(0.092) (0.954) (0.032) (0.000) (0.896) (0.272) (0.658)
Public Investment  0.043*** 0.023 0.032** 0.045*** 0.023 0.049*** 0.056***
(0.002) (0.277) (0.014) (0.000) (0.136) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 176 176 176 176 176 176 176
Notes.  Dependent variable are Voice & Accountability and Control of Corruption. *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where  Voice & Accountability and(or) Control of Corruption are(is) least. P-values in 
brackets.
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Table 6: Democracy  
Democracy 
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant 6.863*** 9.696*** -4.888*** 9.063*** 9.696*** 10.964*** 11.105***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Development Assistance  0.029 -0.097*** 0.052*** -0.029 -0.097*** -0.121*** -0.052***
(0.520) (0.001) (0.000) (0.191) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity 0.072 -0.025 0.179*** -0.036 -0.025 -0.087** -0.111***
(0.442) (0.368) (0.000) (0.429) (0.401) (0.010) (0.000)
Inflation 0.029 0.008 0.011 0.023* 0.008 0.008 0.018***
(0.255) (0.362) (0.134) (0.068) (0.315) (0.382) (0.000)
Population growth -1.655*** -1.014*** 0.335** -1.661*** -1.014*** -1.042*** -0.987***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Autocracy  -0.305*** -1.190*** 0.444*** -0.974*** 1.190*** -1.108*** -1.063***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations  176 176 176 176 176 176 176
Specification 2
Constant 1.493 -0.180 -3.786*** -1.640*** -0.180 7.182*** 8.038***
(0.118) (0.927) (0.000) (0.000) (0.799) (0.000) (0.000)
Development Assistance -0.067 0.027 -0.015 0.032** 0.027 -0.157*** -0.158***
(0.172) (0.738) (0.529) (0.035) (0.448) (0.000) (0.000)
Foreign Direct Investment 0.069 -0.067 0.176*** 0.085*** -0.067 -0.160*** -0.126***
(0.436) (0.691) (0.000) (0.002) (0.308) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade  0.004 0.041*** -0.008* -0.0008 0.041*** 0.017*** 0.018***
(0.632) (0.003) (0.066) (0.763) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Per capita Economic Prosperity -0.052 -0.294** 0.199*** 0.098*** -0.294*** -0.147*** -0.025*
(0.576) (0.025) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.058)
Public Investment  0.317*** 0.232** 0.340*** 0.196*** 0.232*** 0.124*** 0.016
(0.002) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.270)
Observations 176 176 176 176 176 176 176
Notes.  Dependent variable is Democracy.  *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) 
signify nations where  democracy  is least. P-values in brackets. 
4.2 Discussion, policy recommendations and limitations
Before delving into the discussion of the findings, it will be interesting to point-out the 
intuition motivating this paper. From the interesting literature on aid and institutions, the debate 
has centered around three main questions as we have already elucidated above. This preceding 
analysis has integrated the last two strands (questions) within the same empirical framework. 
Thus in a bid to put some empirical structure on these last two concerns in the aid-institutions 
nexus(so as to give policy makers guidance on the issues), this work has elucidated the following 
questions.  (1)  Are the institutional  benefits  of development-assistance contingent  on existing 
institutional  quality (second  strand)? (2)At  what  institutional  thresholds  will  foreign-aid  be 
instrumental in improving institutional quality (third strand)? (3) Are the institutional benefits of 
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foreign-aid questionable until greater domestic institutional development has taken place (second 
and third strands)? 
Based on the available weight of empirical evidence (as summarized in Table 2 above) 
we have  stressed  that  foreign-aid  is  more  likely  to  improve  institutional  development  when 
existing institutional development levels are low than when they are high. This affirmation is 
valid for all seven government quality dynamics subject to consideration in the analysis. Thus 
the following answers could be provided to the tested hypotheses. (1) Institutional benefits of 
foreign-aid are contingent on existing institutional levels in Africa. (2) But for thin exceptions, 
foreign-aid  is  instrumental  in  institutional  development  in  bottom quantiles  of  government-
quality  distributions  for  the  most  part.  (3)  The  institutional  benefits  of  foreign-aid  are  not 
questionable until greater domestic institutional development has taken place. The reverse is true 
instead.  Government  quality benefits  of development  assistance are questionable in countries 
with high levels of institutional development. As a policy implication, blanket policies based on 
the aid-development nexus are unlikely to be appropriate; therefore policy measures should be 
contingent on prevailing levels of institutional development and tailored differently across best 
and worst countries in terms of institutional development.  
These results only partially validate recent findings (with updated data) in the African 
continent which have established that foreign-aid is perilous to government quality dynamics 
(Asongu, 2012a).  This  difference  in results  is  entirely methodological  and points to need of 
assessing the impact of foreign-aid through-out the conditional distributions of the institutional 
development  dependent  variable.  Results  of  the paper  may either  broadly reflect  the first  or 
second strand of conflicts in the literature (summarized in Table 1) depending on which part of 
the  distribution  the  observer  stands.  Whereas  top  quantiles  of  the   institutional  distributions 
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broadly reflect the first school of thought in the assertion of a negative aid-development nexus 
(Mosley,1992;  Reichel,  1995;  Ghura,  1995;  Boone,  1996;  Pedersen,1996;  Asongu,  2012ab), 
bottom institutional quantile results validate postulations of the second strand, in which the aid-
development nexus is perceived as positive(Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Ghura, 1995; Guillaumont 
&  Chauvet,  2001; Collier  & Dehn, 2001; Collier  & Dollar,2001; Feeny,  2003; Gomanee et 
al.,2003; Clement et al.,2004; Ishfaq,2004; Mosley et al.,2004; Addison et al.,2005; Fielding et 
al.,2006).  
It  is  also interesting  to highlight  that this  paper has drawn much from the openness-
development literature. It has been well documented in the globalization-development literature 
that certain ‘threshold’ levels of financial and institutional development are imperative for an 
economy get the full indirect benefits and reduced risks of capital account globalization (Henry, 
2007; Rodrik & Subramanian, 2009; Kose et al., 2011). Empirically assessing the aid-institutions 
nexus in the light of available weight of empirical evidence on ‘threshold theories’ from the 
openness-development literature has provided relevant policy implications on the two research 
strands this paper has assessed from the aid-institutions literature. Though not in form, yet in 
substance we have complemented existing literature which  points to the existence of certain 
initial  institutional  threshold  conditions(corruption,  democracy…etc)  but  lacks  a  unifying 
framework  that  explores  the  most  quantifiable  government  quality  indicators  currently 
available(rule of law, regulation quality, corruption-control, government-effectiveness, voice & 
accountability, political stability or no violence and democracy). 
The principal draw-back of these indicators however is that, they are perception-based 
measurements  and  could  be  subject  to  biased  estimates  (owing  to  media  propaganda  for 
instance).  However  to  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  good-governance  measures  from  World 
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Development  Indicators  are  the  most  reliable  institutional  measures  in  the  development 
literature.  More so, the use of a plethora of them (seven in total)  and finding similar results  
across indicators somehow mitigates issues owing to variable selection bias. In substance this 
adds  to  the  robustness  of  our  empirical  evidence  and  soundness  of  resulting  policy 
recommendations. 
5. Conclusion
The  contribution  of  this  paper  to  the  literature  has  been  fivefold.  Firstly,  we  have 
deviated from the mainstream approach to the aid-institutions nexus that does not incorporate all 
dimensions  of  government  quality  and  provided  an  exhaustive  assessment  with  seven 
institutional quality dynamics. Secondly, a substantial bulk of work in the literature is based on 
data collected between 1960 and 2001. By using much recent data, the paper has provided an 
updated account of the aid-development nexus with more focused policy implications. Thirdly, 
owing to the debate on methodological issues in the assessment of foreign-aid effectiveness, this 
paper has provided new dimensions to the debate by investigating the aid-development nexus 
when existing institutional quality dynamics matter. Thus there has been a presumption here that 
certain institutional thresholds might be imperative for the institutional effectiveness of foreign-
aid.  Fourthly,  this  paper  has  integrated  two  of  the  three  strands  currently  prevailing  in  the 
literature by putting some empirical structure on them, in order to give policymakers the much 
needed guidance.  Fifthly,  with 2015 drawing nigh it  was momentous time to assess donors’ 
objective of reaching the MDGs. In plainer terms, assessing the effectiveness of development 
assistance on institutions by virtue of the four points highlighted above (in the run-up to 2015) 
has provided crucial policy options to donor and multilateral agencies on their assistance impact.
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The following hypotheses resulting from the broad literature review and positioning of 
the  paper  have  been  tested. (1)  Are  the  institutional  benefits  of  development-assistance 
contingent on existing levels of institutional  quality (second strand)? (2)At what institutional 
thresholds will foreign-aid be instrumental in improving institutional quality (third strand)? (3) 
Are  the  institutional  benefits  of  foreign-aid  questionable  until  greater  domestic  institutional 
development  has  taken  place  (second  and  third  strands)?  Based  on  the  weight  of  resulting 
empirical  evidence,  the  following answers  have been drawn from the  tested  hypotheses.  (1) 
Institutional benefits of foreign-aid are contingent on existing institutional levels in Africa. (2) 
But  for  a  thin  exception,  foreign-aid  is  instrumental  in  institutional  development  in  bottom 
quantiles of government-quality distributions for the most part. (3) The institutional benefits of 
foreign-aid are not questionable until greater domestic institutional development has taken place. 
The  reverse  is  true  instead.  Government  quality  benefits  of  development  assistance  are 
questionable  in  countries  with existing high levels  of  institutional  development.  As a policy 
implication, blanket policies based on the aid-development nexus are unlikely to be appropriate; 
therefore policy measures should be contingent on prevailing levels of institutional development 
and tailored differently across best and worst countries in terms of institutional development.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics and Presentation of Countries 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations
Quality of 
Government 
Rule of Law -0.454 0.626 -1.642 1.053 176
Regulation Quality -0.353 0.520 -1.431 0.905 176
Government Effectiveness -0.390 0.561 -1.539 0.807 176
Political Stability -0.381 0.874 -2.647 1.122 176
Voice & Accountability -0.424 0.743 -1.682 0.947 176
Control of Corruption -0.437 0.584 -1.466 1.086 176




Total DA 7.518 7.447 -0.251 52.823 176
DA from Multilateral Donors 2.951 3.084 -0.235 13.246 176
DA from DAC countries 4.527 4.709 -0.315 39.536 176
Control 
Variables
Economic Prosperity(GDPg) 5.333 3.634 -3.653 20.613 176
Per capita Economic Prosperity(GDPpcg) 3.139 3.361 -5.069 17.114 176
Population Growth 2.098 0.741 0.508 3.389 176
Inflation 9.511 12.194 -1.050 108.90 176
Public Investment 7.433 3.420 2.307 16.787 176
Financial Openness(FDI) 3.483 3.594 -4.972 24.943 176
Trade Openness(Trade) 77.422 38.732 32.683 209.41 176
Autocracy 1.693 3.229 -8.000 9.000 176
Panel B: Presentation of Countries 
       Angola, Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. FDI: Foreign Direct  Investment. GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg: GDP per capita  
growth. DA: Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee. 
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        Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis
Government Quality Development Assistance Control Variables 
RL RQ GE PolS V&A CC Demo DA DAMD DADAC FDI Trade GDPg GDPpcg Popg Infl Auto PubIvt
1.000 0.854 0.924 0.754 0.783 0.896 0.657 -0.196 -0.137 -0.217 0.044 0.168 -0.178 -0.073 -0.504 -0.180 -0.089 0.146 RL
1.000 0.911 0.658 0.806 0.826 0.601 -0.256 -0.240 -0.243 -0.044 0.071 -0.233 -0.147 -0.435 -0.253 -0.194 -0.082 RQ
1.000 0.722 0.821 0.918 0.674 -0.227 -0.179 -0.238 -0.019 0.092 -0.179 -0.077 -0.494 -0.170 -0.144 0.078 GE
1.000 0.763 0.735 0.682 -0.088 -0.071 -0.087 0.084 0.353 -0.159 -0.086 -0.361 -0.117 -0.036 0.164 PolS
1.000 0.731 0.840 -0.100 -0.094 -0.091 0.057 0.113 -0.181 -0.136 -0.241 -0.130 -0.426 -0.002 V&A
1.000 0.596 -0.211 -0.145 -0.235 0.031 0.238 -0.232 -0.111 -0.590 -0.186 -0.120 0.165 CC
1.000 -0.042 -0.018 -0.052 0.074 0.150 -0.052 -0.008 -0.202 0.032 -0.186 0.223 Demo
1.000 0.928 0.970 0.084 -0.288 0.232 0.138 0.472 0.079 -0.090 -0.345 DA
1.000 0.811 0.045 -0.235 0.227 0.146 0.418 0.071 -0.057 0.416 DAMD
1.000 0.105 -0.299 0.214 0.120 0.471 0.080 -0.107 0.267 DADAC
1.000 0.203 0.003 0.012 -0.035 0.480 -0.024 0.066 FDI
1.000 -0.141 -0.023 -0.563 0.209 0.051 0.235 Trade
1.000 0.977 0.345 0.248 0.200 0.177 GDPg
1.000 0.139 0.218 0.237 0.194 GDPpcg
1.000 0.189 -0.116 -0.036 Popg
1.000 0.077 0.177 Inflation
1.000 0.110 Auto
1.000 PubIvt
RL:Rule of Law.  RQ: Regulation Quality.  GE: Government Effectiveness.  V&A: Voice & Accountability.  CC: Corruption-Control.  Demo: Democracy. FDI: Foreign Direct  Investment.  GDPg: GDP  
growth. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. Popg: Population growth. PubIvt: Public Investment. DA: Net Official Development Assistance. Auto: Autocracy. Inf:Inflation.
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions
Variables Signs Variable Definitions Source
Rule of Law   RL Rule of Law(estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Regulation Quality   RQ Regulation Quality (estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Government Effectiveness   GE Government Effectiveness(estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Political Stability   PolS Political Stability/ No Violence (estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Voice & Accountability  V&A Voice and Accountability (estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Control of Corruption CC Control of Corruption(estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Democracy   Demo Level of Institutionalized Democracy World Bank(WDI)
Development Assistance    1 DA Total Development assistance(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Development Assistance    2 DAMD Development Assistance from Multilateral Donors(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Development Assistance    3 DADAC Development Assistance from DAC Countries (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
External Debt Flow FDI Foreign Direct Investment(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Trade(Openness) Trade Imports plus Exports in commodities(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Population growth Popg Average annual population growth rate World Bank(WDI)
Public Investment  PubIvt Gross Public Investment(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Inflation Infl Consumer Price Index(annual %) World Bank(WDI)
Economic Prosperity GDPg GDP Growth(annual %) World Bank(WDI)
Autocracy Auto Level of Institutionalized Autocracy World Bank(WDI)
Per Capita Economic 
prosperity 
GDPpcg GDP per capita Growth(annual %) World Bank(WDI)
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  DAC: Development Assistance Committee. 
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